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The Jan Sangh drew its organised strength, centralised character
and ideological homogeneity from the RSS. Also, the grass roots
workers, the well-trained and disciplined cadre and organisers
and top leaders of the Jan Sangh were provided by the RSS.
Now that the Bharatiya Janata Party has come to occupy the seat
of power at the Centre, it is of some interest to take a look at
its predecessor, Jan Sangh. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, founded in
October 1951, was basically a communal party and has to be
understood as such.
A communal party is one which is structured around a communal
ideology. The communal ideology is central to it, it is the very
reason for the party's existence. Without the communal ideology,
the party disintegrates. Also, a communal party cannot be defined
by specific policies, for it can discard any of its programmatic
and policy elements and sometimes adopt the very opposite ones.
Its economic, political and social policies are generally a husk
or mask which can be changed at appropriate moments to suit its
electoral or other political needs, which it perceives as
essential for capturing political power which, in turn, is needed
for implementing its communal agenda. A communal party is not a
conservative party for it is not committed to the conservation of
large elements of the existing social, economic and political
structure. It is, however, a right-wing party for it cannot
communalise the state and society without strengthening the
reactionary, exploitative elements of the economy.
The Jan Sangh could not, however, openly profess its communal
ideology as it had to function within two major constraints.
Being an electoral party within the confines of a secular
democratic polity and Constitution, it had to try to cobble
together an electoral majority and therefore appeal to non-
communal voters as also obey the electoral laws forbidding
political appeals to religion. Second, because of the firm
ideological commitment of the national movement and the anti-
communal sentiment in India, especially after the assassination
of Gandhiji, communalism had a bad odour about it.
Hence, to understand the basic communal character of the Jan
Sangh and its politics, one has to first study the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), for the former was a creation of the RSS
and had remained under the latter's tight ideological and
organisational control since its foundation, especially after the
death of its first president, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, in 1953.
It drew its organised strength, centralised character and
ideological homogeneity from the RSS. Also, the grass roots
workers, the well-trained and disciplined cadre and organisers
and in time almost all top leaders of the Jan Sangh, especially
its secretaries and general secretaries, were provided by the
RSS.
Founded in 1925, the RSS was organised on authoritarian and
militaristic lines and, functioning below the surface and
glorifying violence, it was developed basically as an anti-Muslim
organisation. It did not participate in the anti-imperialist
movement or wage any anti-imperialist struggle even of its own
conception on the ground that it had to conserve its strength for
its main task of protecting Hindus from Muslim domination. It
grew in northern India in the 1940s because of communalisation of
politics during the War years and large-scale communal violence,
in which it played an active role during 1946-1947.
The RSS was banned and its leaders and workers were arrested
after the assassination of Gandhiji. Though not directly involved
in the assassination, it had been waging a campaign of hatred
against Gandhiji and other Congress leaders publicly and in its
shakhas or branches, it often branded Gandhiji and other national
leaders anti-Hindu and ``traitors.'' Referring to them, M. S.
Golwalkar, supreme head of the RSS nominated as such for life,
wrote in 1939: ``Strange, very strange, that traitors should be
enthroned as national heroes.'' In 1947, he accused Gandhiji of
asking ``all Hindus to become Muslims.'' Pouring venom, he said
the Congress leaders were asking the ``Hindu'' to ignore, even
submit meekly, to the vandalism and atrocities of the Muslims. In
effect, he was told: ``Forget all that the Muslims have done in
the past and all that they are now doing to you... if they carry
away your wives and daughters, let them. Do not obstruct them.
That would be violence.'' The reference to violence in the end
makes it clear that Golwalkar's finger was pointing at Gandhiji.
It was this vicious communal campaign of hatred which created an
anti-Gandhi hysteria and the atmosphere for his assassination. It
is immaterial which group the assassin belonged to.
Keen on persuading the government to lift the ban on the RSS, its
leaders gave an undertaking in 1949 that it would not take part
in politics. But, in fact, they were quite keen on playing an
active role. And since the RSS could not directly enter politics
under its own banner, it decided to do so through a party of its
own, Jan Sangh, which it could run and control firmly from behind
the scenes, through its cadre and organisation men.
Working in the shadows through the `front' organisation gave the
RSS another advantage: it did not have to camouflage over-much
its basic ideological commitment as the Jan Sangh had to. The RSS
was avowedly communal and anti-Muslim. However, its communal
ideology seldom found expression in print. It was assiduously,
orally articulated in and spread through its shakhas or branches,
where its young members imbibed it in its full virulence. The
only two major publications of the RSS were by Golwalkar: the
pamphlet We or Our Nationhood Defined, published in 1939, and a
collection of his speeches and articles, The Bunch of Thoughts,
published in 1966. Since 1949, the other sources of the RSS's
ideological moorings have been the two unofficial organs of the
RSS and the Jan Sangh, the weeklies, Panchjanya (Hindi) and
Organiser (English).
The basic guidelines of communalism and the communal approach of
the RSS were laid down by Golwalkar in We, where the Muslims were
portrayed as a perpetually hostile and alien element within the
Indian body politic and society, who must either accept total
subordination to the Hindus or cease to be Muslim, as will be
evident from the following quotation...
``In Hindustan exists and must needs exist the ancient Hindu
nation and nought else but the Hindu nation... So long, however,
as they (Muslims and other non-Hindus) maintain their social,
religious and cultural differences, they cannot but be only
foreigners ... There are only two courses open to the foreign
elements, either to merge themselves in the national race and
adopt its culture, or to live at the sweet will of the national
race ... The non-Hindu peoples in Hindustan must either adopt the
Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in
reverence Hindu religion ... in one word, they must cease to be
foreigners, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to
the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far
less any preferential treatment - not even citizen's rights ...
in this country, Hindus alone are the Nation and the Muslims and
others, if not actually anti-national, are at least outside the
body of the Nation.''
Golwalkar repeatedly referred to the Muslims as ``our foes'',
``our old and bitter enemies'', ``our most inveterate enemies''
and so on, and said: ``We Hindus are at war at once with the
Muslims, on the one hand, and the British, on the other.'' In
October 1991, Balasaheb Deoras, successor of Golwalkar as the
head of the RSS, condemned ``the aggressive and divisive
mentality of the Muslims'' and accused the secular parties of not
hesitating ``to sacrifice national interest and to fulfil even
the anti-national political aspirations of the Muslims.''
Consequently, in view of the carefully cultivated communal
feelings among its cadre and adherents by the RSS, it was not
accidental, as the noted journalist Krishan Bhatia wrote in 1971,
that ``the RSS has been behind some of the worst communal riots
during the past 30 years.''
On a more popular plane, the Organiser and the Panchjanya
continue to this day to publish articles stressing, with greater
or lesser stridency depending on the political situation, that
the Hindus constitute the Indian nation and emphasising the
dangers from schemes of `Islamisation of India'.
The issues which really mattered to the Jan Sangh and on which
the party and its members exerted themselves were communal. The
party's popular slogans and everyday agitational issues were
filtered through the communal glasses or ideology.
THE Jan Sangh was launched as a political party in October 1951
with Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee as its president. After his
resignation from Jawaharlal Nehru's Cabinet in April 1950,
Mookerjee was looking for a party and the RSS was looking for a
leader - the two came together. Ostensibly, the Jan Sangh was a
party in its own right and under Mookerjee it did enjoy a certain
degree of independence, but even then its spearhead was the RSS
and its carefully- chosen cadre who were put in crucial positions
in the new party. After Mookerjee's death in 1953, the fig-leaf
of its being an independent party was gradually given up. Since
1954, when its second president, Mauli Chandra Sharma, resigned
in protest against the RSS domination of the party, the Jan Sangh
and its later-day reincarnation, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
have been more openly associated with and controlled by the RSS,
which has provided them with the bulk of their leaders at the top
as well as lower levels.
The Jan Sangh, as a communal party, could not be defined by its
economic and political policies, since it could change them with
how the wind blows, without hesitation. It did, of course, have
an economic programme, foreign policy, etc, but they were not of
much relevance to its politics apart from serving its demagogic
purposes. For example, it was initially opposed to the Nehruvian
economic policies and quite pro-private enterprise. But, later,
it adopted quite a radical economic programme befitting a petit
bourgeoise-based `national-socialist' type party. It then
championed a mixed economy based on planning and public sector,
the latter controlling the commanding heights of the economy. It
also supported zamindari abolition, land ceilings and land to the
tiller, the cause of agricultural labour and of the working class
in the modern sector regulation of large-scale industries,
nationalisation of key industries, service cooperatives in the
rural sector and ceilings on personal income, etc.
For the Jan Sangh, all its economic and political positions were
merely formal. The issues which really mattered and on which the
party and its members concentrated and exerted themselves were
very different, namely communal questions. All the party's
popular slogans and everyday agitational issues were filtered
through the communal glasses or ideology.
But the party declared itself non-communal and secular and
formally admitted Muslims as members. Initially, it also declared
that its objective was to work not for a Hindu Rashtra but a
Bharatiya Rashtra; but the latter was so defined as to stand for
a Hindu Rashtra. Admitting the Muslims was perceived by the party
leaders and cadre as a mere formality and technicality - a
political manoeuvre. The Jan Sangh workers at the lower level,
its leaders in public speeches and its journals promoted in a
subtle and subterranean manner distrust and hatred of the
Muslims. In particular, they carried on a campaign against the
Muslims for their alleged disloyal and anti-national
proclivities.
The Jan Sangh consistently accused the secular parties of
appeasing Muslims and pandering to their interests. Even a sober
leader like Mookerjee attacked Nehru regularly for following ``a
suicidal policy of appeasement of Muslims''. On its part, the Jan
Sangh declared that it would promote national unity by
``nationalising all non-Hindus by inculcating in them the ideal
of Bharatiya culture''.
The Jan Sangh was strongly anti-Pakistan. According to one of its
resolutions passed at the end of 1960s, Pakistan's ``aim is to
sustain the faith of Indian Muslims with the ultimate objective
of establishing Muslim domination over the rest of India as
well.'' In its initial years, the Jan Sangh argued for reuniting
India and Pakistan in pursuit of its central objective of an
Akhand Bharat. The Jan Sangh also accused the government of
consistently pursuing a policy of appeasement of Pakistan. Later
the slogan of Akhand Bharat was abandoned and even hostility to
Pakistan muted, especially after the Jan Sangh merged with the
Janata Party in 1977 and Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee became the
Foreign Minister; but hostility to the Muslims as proxies for
Pakistan remained as before.
The Jan Sangh emphasised the propagation of the Bharatiya culture
and the establishment of Bharatiya nationalism. These two terms
were never defined except vaguely as being based on non-Western
and traditional values. In fact, the word `Bharatiya' was a
euphemism for `Hindu' and using it was an attempt on the part of
the Jan Sangh to avoid the communal label. As communalism began
to grow, the Jan Sangh publications openly started using the
terms `Hindu culture' and `Hindu nationalism' and continue to do
so. In reality, even the term `Hindu nationalism' was a misnomer
and substitute for `Hindu communalism'.
Denying the cultural diversity of India, the Jan Sangh raised the
slogan of ``one country, one culture, one nation'' and asserted
that all those who did not accept this one culture had imbibed
`anti-national traits'. There was also a strong element of
revivalism in its talk of Bharatiya spiritual and material values
and of the revival of the Bharatiya culture and not of its
development. It also accused the Congress of importing foreign
technology and promised that instead it would aim at developing
``a self-sufficient and self-governing economy'' by developing
``our own technique''. A disguised opposition to parliamentary
democracy and secularism was also intended when it repeatedly
accused the Congress of developing Indian political life on the
basis of foreign ideas. However, it gradually gave up such
revivalist formulations, as also its talk of the Bharatiya
values. Their place was taken by the openly communal term
`Hindutva'.
For years, the Jan Sangh took a strident stand and agitational
approach in favour of Sanskritised Hindi and against the
retention of English as an official link language. Later, keeping
in view its need for expansion in non-Hindi areas, it quietly
accepted the 1965 decision to retain English along with Hindi so
long as the non-Hindi States wanted this. It also opposed the
development of Urdu in Uttar Pradesh and other parts of northern
India. It forcefully opposed the Hindu Code Bills and, after
their passage, pledged to repeal them.
Interestingly, the Jan Sangh opposed the linking of religion with
politics and did not take up any religious issue other than that
of a legal ban on cow slaughter. The why and how of the change in
this respect in the 1980s belong to the history of the BJP.
In fact, significant changes in the official programme and
policies, as also in the social and regional base of the Jan
Sangh-BJP, occurred over the years. Only the centrality of
communal ideology remained. And, of course, no party or
leadership can be separated from the ideology with which it
operates among the people.
Electorally, the Jan Sangh remained throughout its first
existence on the margins of the Indian polity. In 1952, it won
three seats in the Lok Sabha with 3.06 per cent of the national
vote. (The combined total of the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha
and the Ram Rajya Parishad was 10 seats with 6.4 per cent of the
votes. Thus, the overall performance of the three Hindu communal
parties was quite poor). In 1957, the Jan Sangh won four seats
with 5.97 per cent of the total votes. This did not mark any real
growth of communalism, for it occurred because the Jan Sangh
absorbed a large part of the political base of the Hindu
Mahasabha and the RRP, the total score of the three parties being
five MPs with 7.17 per cent of the votes.
In 1962, the Jan Sangh won 14 seats with 6.44 per cent of the
total votes - the three communal parties got 17 seats and 7.69
per cent of the votes. The high watermark of the Jan Sangh before
it became the BJP was reached in 1967 when it won 35 seats with
9.35 per cent of the popular vote, with the Hindu Mahasabha and
the RRP having disappeared as political forces. Its tally,
however, came down again in 1971 when it got 22 seats in the Lok
Sabha and 7.4 per cent of the votes.
Throughout, the party did not win a single seat in south India
and it lost its political hold completely in West Bengal after
the death of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. In fact, its political
influence was confined to Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh,
Delhi, Rajasthan, U.P., Madhya Pradesh and Bihar.
(The writer is a former Professor of History, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.)
[Source: THE HINDU ONLINE : Monday, May 11, 1998 Opinion]